So should Bush retreat? Not at all. The irony is that only the overthrow of Saddam would change Arab opinion and the delusional terms of public debate. The leaders of the Arab world are afraid to dispel Arab dreams, since they have no way to justify their own ineffective governments. They don’t dare confront the street, and have to employ doublespeak instead. In the current crisis, this means publicly rejecting a strike against Iraq while privately supporting a decisive and final blow to a regime they all despise.
The Arabs need a shock to wake them up. Egypt’s loss in the 1967 war against Israel undermined the nationalist slogans that had prevailed since Gamal Abdel Nasser took power in 1952. Unfortunately, the defeat laid the ground for the spread of Islamism as an alternative to nationalism, trading one dream for another. Now the potential shock of Saddam’s fall might be what is needed to launch an era of pragmatism.
There are signs that this era is emerging. The Islamist call to arms over the U.S. war in Afghanistan inspired only a few brief demonstrations. As soon as Arab regimes began to respond to American demands that they examine all groups with ties to Al Qaeda, Islamic movements such as the Salafi groups and the Muslim Brotherhood got busy trying to moderate their image and prove that they were in no way connected to terrorism. These moderate leaders have since been condemned by their own rank and file as well as more radical groups, exposing a split in the Islamic movement as a whole. Despite the rift, the Islamic credo has not collapsed. In purely operational terms, Osama bin Laden’s attack against the United States was successful, and gave extremists confidence that they could hurt the sole superpower. In addition, the mystery over whether bin Laden was killed by American firepower has given young zealots hope. Uncertainty about his fate is thus a coup for Al Qaeda recruiters.
Nonetheless, the American war on terror will further weaken the Islamic movements; most Arab regimes are happy for this opportunity to further diminish extremist influence. And Saddam’s fall would shatter the Arab dreamscape. Once the United States shuts down a despot who fed his hungry people on slogans of Arab grandeur, it will be difficult for others to serve up the same diet. Domestic unrest is likely, and the next stage in Arab history will be one of internal confrontations. After Saddam, not one Arab regime, including Syria and Libya, will dare oppose the United States. Most will be forced to adopt slogans of reform to quiet frustrated masses. If Washington can bring in Arab countries as mediators in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, then the region will be transformed.
The Saddam shock would end an Arab era that began with the 1948 war against the newly created state of Israel. The Arabs have tried all sorts of slogans since then. The nationalists dreamed of Pan-Arab unity. The Islamists envisioned an Islamic state. But there are no dreams left. After Saddam, the dismantling of the extremist Islamic parties and the containment of the Palestinian issue, most Arab rulers will no longer be able to hide behind foggy visions. They will lose the luxury of what political scientist Mohammed Jaber Al-Ansari has called “crisis logic”–justifying their own power as necessary to combat external threats. They will have to open their eyes, and confront problems at home in a sober and practical way.
